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Introduction
Policy debates related to stimulus packages and fiscal consolidation programs have renewed academic
interest about the effects of government activity. The short-run government spending multiplier, i.e.
the response of current GDP consecutive to a unit increase in government spending, has attracted
considerable attention despite the large uncertainty surrounding its measurement (see Ramey (2011a)
for a recent survey). Estimated values of the multiplier vary with many factors including the econo-
metric approach, the identification strategy, the structural model, the nature and duration of the
fiscal change, or the state of the economy (see among others, Cogan et al. (2010), Uhlig (2010),
Christiano et al. (2011), Ramey (2011b), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Coenen et al. (2012),
Fe`ve et al. (2013), or Erceg and Linde´ (2014)).
Does the time profile of government spending affect fiscal multipliers? We revisit this classic
question using a tractable business cycle model with physical capital accumulation, endogenous
labor supply and stochastic government spending. Closed-form solutions for the equilibrium of that
economy show that the persistence of government spending shapes short-run multipliers through the
response of private investment.
The main contribution of this paper is to pin down the persistence of government spending for
which a capital demand effect triggered by the increase in expected employment offsets the usual
crowding-out effect on investment. This threshold persistence value also measures the equilibrium
adjustment speed of consumption, which varies across economic environments. Should private in-
vestment increase, the output multiplier would be magnified compared to an economy where capital
is held constant. Conversely, transitory fiscal stimuli do not provide any incentive to accumulate
physical capital and give up a potentially important propagation mechanism.
Our analysis connects dynamic multipliers in an economy with capital accumulation to constant-
capital multipliers. Constant-capital models are often used to deliver analytical results on multiplier,
as in Hall (2009), Woodford (2011), Christiano et al. (2011) or Fe`ve et al. (2013). In frictionless
setups, constant–capital multipliers only result from the intra-temporal allocations (the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, the marginal productivity of labor and the
aggregate resources constraint) but ignore expectations about the timing of government policy.1
We also connect our results with long-run (non-stochastic steady-state) multipliers which take
into account total adjustment of physical capital. We show that long-run multipliers can be obtained
1This is not true a sticky price version in which expectations matters. See the discussion in Christiano et al. (2011).
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as the limit case of dynamic multipliers after a permanent shock to government spending.
The model we use is sufficiently simple, given its functional forms on utility and production func-
tions, to get analytical and insightful results. It nevertheless shares the key ingredients present in the
DSGE literature: the utility is separable between consumption and leisure (consumption and leisure
are deliberately maintained as normal goods), a constant return-to-scale technology combines labor
and capital inputs, and the stochastic process of non–productive government spending is exogenous
and persistent. These core assumptions are present in most current DSGE models (see Coenen et al.
(2012) or Smets and Wouters’ (2003, 2007)).
To complement our results, we extend our analysis to incorporate two key parameters of DSGE
modeling: the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply. These two model versions nest our basic setup, making it simple to inspect the mechanism
at work. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption only modifies the size of the
constant capital multiplier, but does not alter the effects of the government spending driven by
expectations. The elasticity of labor supply plays in two directions. First, when this elasticity is
lower, the constant capital multiplier is smaller because the labor supply is less responsive after the
negative income effect. Second, a smaller elasticity of labor supply reduces the adjustment speed
of consumption (for a given level of physical capital). This implies that the threshold value of the
autoregressive parameter on government spending must be higher to insure a positive response of
saving.
Finally, we consider two types of market imperfections. First, we study external endogenous
discounting, assuming that an increase in aggregate consumption makes agents more impatient (see
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003), in a small open economy setup). Endogenous external discounting
reinforces the investment channel and magnifies our previous results. As government spending crowds
out private consumption, households become more patient and thus save more. In this economy, the
threshold value on the persistence parameter is smaller, making the government spending policy
more effective. Second, we allow for imperfect financial markets under the form of hand-to-mouth
consumers (see Gal´ı et al. (2007)). Our previous results are magnified. When the fraction of these
households is large enough, aggregate consumption may increase after a governement spending shock.
However, a positive response of consumption is neither necessary nor sufficient to obtain an output
multiplier above unity.
Our results build on the existing literature and make progress on several dimensions. As compared
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to Aiyagari et al. (1992), Baxter and King (1993) and Campbell (1994), we extend the analysis
in three directions. First, we determine analytically under which conditions private investment
increases after a positive shock to government spending (our threshold value depends on preferences
and technology). Second, we decompose the short-run multipliers of all aggregate variables (output,
consumption and investment) into a static component, the constant capital multiplier, and a term
related to expectations about future government spending policy. Third, we consider economies
with market imperfections. Leeper et al. (2011) show quantitatively, as we do analytically, that the
persistence of the government spending shock is essential for obtaining a large output multipliers
in calibrated DSGE models. Our results show under which conditions a larger multiplier can be
obtained. Leeper et al. (2011) also find that the fraction of hand-to-mouth consumers matters a lot
for multipliers. Again, we are able to disentangle the two key mechanisms at work (intra-temporal
and inter-temporal) when considering that a fraction of households has no access to financial markets.
The paper is organized as follows. In the first two sections, we consider a prototypical model
and derive closed-form solutions. In the third section, we extend the model in two directions: non-
unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and a finite elasticity of labor supply.
In a fourth section, we consider two types of market imperfections and inspect how they modify
multipliers. A last section concludes.
1 A Prototypical Model with Government Spending
We first consider a business cycle model with physical capital accumulation, endogenous labor supply
and exogenous non–productive government spending. We also assume complete capital depreciation
and utility function linear in leisure. Despite its simplicity, this model contains the key ingredients
that we want to highlight. The last two restrictions will be relaxed in section 3.
1.1 The Setup
The inter-temporal expected utility function of the representative household is given by
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi {{log ct+i + η (1− nt+i)}+ v(gt+i)} (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the discount factor, Et is the expectation operator conditional on the
information set available as of time t and η > 0. Time endowment is normalized to unity, ct
denotes period-t real consumption and nt represents the household’s labor supply. We follow Hansen
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(1985) and Rogerson (1988) and assume labor indivisibility, so that in a setup with perfect financial
insurance, the utility is linear in leisure. This assumption simplifies computations a lot because the
real wage and the real interest rate depend only on real consumption (see below). Beacuse this
specification boosts the response of the economy to a government spending shock, we will investigate
in section 3 the role of finite labor supply elasticity. The function v(.) is increasing and concave in gt.
Government spending delivers utility in an additively separable fashion and does not affect optimal
choices on consumption and leisure. Without any normative perspective, this additive term in utility
allows government spending to be useful.
The representative firm uses capital kt and labor nt to produce the homogeneous final good yt.
The technology is represented by the following constant returns–to–scale Cobb–Douglas production
function2
yt = Ak
θ
tn
1−θ
t , (2)
where A > 0 is a scale parameter and θ ∈ (0, 1). Under full depreciation, the capital stock evolves
according to
kt+1 = xt (3)
Finally, the final good can be either consumed, invested or devoted to unproductive government
spending financed through lump-sum taxes:
yt = ct + xt + gt, (4)
where gt denotes exogenous government spending. For a given level of output, an increase in govern-
ment spending reduces the resources available for consumption and investment. Agents may respond
to this shock through changes in their consumption, investment, and/or labor supply decisions.
The dynamic equilibrium of this economy is summarized by the following equations
kt+1 = yt − ct − gt (5)
yt = Ak
θ
tn
1−θ
t (6)
ηct = (1− θ) yt
nt
(7)
1
ct
= βθEt
[(
yt+1
kt+1
)
1
ct+1
]
(8)
2 All our main results are left unaffected if we consider a CES production function, allowing for a non unitary
elasticity of substitution between inputs. Results are available from the authors upon request.
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Equations (5) and (6) define the law of motion of physical capital (after substitution of the aggregate
resource constraint (4) into (3)) and the production function (equation (2)). Equation (7) equates
at equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure with the marginal
product of labor. Equation (8) represents the Euler equation on consumption. Equation (7) will
simplify a lot further computations. To see this, let us combine equations (6) and (7). We deduce
yt = A
1/θ
(
1− θ
θ
) 1−θ
θ
ktc
− 1−θ
θ
t
Using the definition of the real wage wt and the real interest rate rt (in a competitive decentralized
equilibrium), we see that factor prices only depend on consumption levels: wt = ηct and rt =
A1/θ [(1− θ)/θ] 1−θθ c−
1−θ
θ
t − 1. After replacement into the Euler equation on consumption (8), one
obtains
c−1t = βθEt
[
A1/θ
(
1− θ
θ
) 1−θ
θ
c
− 1
θ
t+1
]
,
so the Euler equation becomes an autonomous first order (non–linear) equation in consumption.
It follows that this equation directly yields an expectation function about consumption when it
comes at solving the permanent income problem. The lack of feedback effect of capital accumulation
on prices in this equation allows to simply solve our problem. This property will remain true for
other model’s versions (incomplete depreciation, external endogenous discounting, hand–to–mouth
consumers, CES technology, variable capital utilization) as soon as the infinite elasticity of labor
supply is maintained. Conversely, when we consider finite elasticity of labor supply, both the real
wage and the real interest rate will depend on the capital stock. This situation will be considered in
Section 3.2.
Before analyzing fiscal multipliers in our dynamic stochastic economy, we present a restricted
economy which provides an useful benchmark.
1.2 Constant Capital Government Spending Multipliers
We first consider a variant of our economy where the supply of physical capital is held fixed. Ab-
sent capital accumulation, intra–temporal allocations (between consumption and leisure) can be set
statically, period by period, for successive values of government spending gt. Fiscal multipliers are
evaluated from the repeated static version of our model and depend on preferences, technology and
steady–state ratios but they are independent from the process of government spending. To make
sure the different economies we study have similar scales, we set the fixed levels of investment and
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capital, as well as the share of government spending in output, equal to their steady-state values in
the variable-capital economy. We also consider the same preferences and technology parameters. We
first introduce the following definition of constant capital government spending multipliers.
Definition 1 Constant capital government spending multipliers refer to changes in aggregate vari-
ables consecutive to a unit increase in government spending expenditures g in an economy defined by
intra–temporal allocations only. The constant-capital output multiplier is denoted
∆y
∆g
∣∣∣∣
k¯
.
The constant-capital investment multiplier ∆x
∆g
∣∣∣
k¯
is null by assumption. The resource constraint
∆y
∆g
∣∣∣∣
k¯
=
∆c
∆g
∣∣∣∣
k¯
+
∆x
∆g
∣∣∣∣
k¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
∆g
∆g
∣∣∣∣
k¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
ties the constant-capital consumption multiplier ∆c
∆g
∣∣∣
k¯
to the constant-capital output multiplier,
∆c
∆g
∣∣∣∣
k¯
=
∆y
∆g
∣∣∣∣
k¯
− 1.
An increase in government spending plays a negative income effect because households have access
to less final goods, ceteris paribus. This static economy shows how much less they choose to consume
and how much more they choose to work (and produce).3 In that fixed capital economy, deep
parameters move the constant capital multipliers on output and consumption in the same direction,
although their signs are opposite.
Proposition 1 When capital is held constant in the economy described in section 1.1, the output
multiplier equals
∆y
∆g
∣∣∣∣
k¯
=
1
1 + θ
1−θ (1− βθ − g¯/y¯)
> 0 (9)
where g¯/y¯ denotes the steady–state share of government spending.
The consumption multiplier equals
∆c
∆g
∣∣∣∣
k¯
=
1
1 + θ
1−θ (1− βθ − g¯/y¯)
− 1 < 0. (10)
3In an open economy, international trade provides another adjustment margin, which explains that fiscal multipliers
are lower (in absolute values). In a small open economy where the real interest rate is exogenous, trade completely
offsets any change in government spending – leaving consumption and labor input unchanged.
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Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 shows that an increase in government spending always reduces private consumption,
∆c
∆g
∣∣∣
k¯
< 0, assuming a strictly positive consumption-to-output ratio.4 This implies that the output
multiplier ∆y
∆g
∣∣∣
k¯
is smaller than one (as in Hall (2009) and Woodford (2011), investment being held
fixed in constant-capital economies. The output multiplier does tend to one when the capital share
θ → 0 because in that limit case, output is linear in labor and capital is irrelevant.
Note that the constant-capital output multiplier remains below one despite an infinitely elastic
labor supply, as implied by the linear disutility of labor. The value of ∆y
∆g
∣∣∣
k¯
in Proposition 1 needs
therefore to be interpreted as an upper bound, as will be shown in Section 3.
Constant capital multipliers serve as a useful first step for two reasons. First, many positive
models used to study fiscal stabilization policy do not model capital accumulation. Models with
nominal rigidities display forward-looking inflation dynamics; capital accumulation adds a backward-
looking dimension which imposes numerical solutions. Hence, fiscal multipliers in this model without
capital accumulation share some features with existing multipliers in the literature. Second, these
multipliers will show up as special cases of the economies with dynamic features we now study.
2 Dynamic Government Spending Multipliers
We now analyze our simple model with capital accumulation and stochastic government spending.
Households face a dynamic problem on top of the static consumption-leisure tradeoff seen in Section
1.2. Increases in government spending still have negative income and wealth effects which may lead
households to consume less and work more. But households can now transfer resources from one
period to the other through the physical asset and display richer saving behaviors.
To solve the intertemporal rational expectations equilibrium of this model, we need to specify
how government spending evolves over time. The log of government spending gt (in deviation from
its deterministic steady state value g¯) follows a simple stochastic process
log gt = ρ log gt−1 + (1− ρ) log g¯ + εt
The previous equation simply rewrites
ĝt = ρĝt−1 + εt (11)
4The consumption-to-output ratio is equal to 1 − βθ − g¯/y¯. A positive ratio at non-stochastic steady-state thus
implies that g¯/y¯ < 1− βθ.
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where ĝt = log gt−log g¯ ' (gt−g¯)/g¯, |ρ| ≤ 1 and ε is a white noise shock to government spending with
zero mean and variance equal to σ2ε . Despite its simplicity, this simple specification of the government
spending is widely used by the DSGE literature (see e.g. Aiyagari et al. (1992), Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992), Campbell (1994), Smets and Wouters (2007), Coenen et al. (2012)).
We solve analytically the log-linear approximation of this economy around its non-stochastic
steady state. The closed form solution fully characterizes the time series properties of aggregate
variables, described in Proposition 2. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to compute a closed-
form solution to this class of problem. It differs from McCallum (1989) which does not consider
government spending.5 Hansen-Rogerson preferences help simplify the dynamical structure of our
model economy. The assumption of complete depreciation, on the other hand, does not change the
nature of the dynamical system. It only simplifies the exposition of the closed form solution.
Proposition 2 In the economy with capital accumulation described in section 1.1, equilibrium con-
sumption ĉt (in relative deviations from steady-state) follows a first-order autoregressive process while
equilibrium investment x̂t follows an autoregressive process of order two. Denoting L the lag operator,
the stochastic process of consumption and investment write
(1− θL) ĉt = − θsg
1− θ + θsc
(
1− βθ2
1− βθρ
)
εt (12)[
1− (θ + ρ)L+ θρL2] x̂t = sg ( ρ− θ
1− βθρ
)
εt. (13)
The stochastic process of output is a linear combination of two autoregressive processes on order
one and one autoregressive process of order two:
ŷt = scĉt + sxx̂t + sgĝt,
where sc = 1− βθ − g¯/y¯, sx = βθ and sg = g¯/y¯ are the consumption to output ratio, the investment
to output ratio and government spending to output ratio, respectively.
Proof: See Appendix B.
This analytic characterization delivers the impulse response function of each aggregate variable
following a government spending shock ε0 > 0. The main results of this paper, laid out in the next
section (propositions 3 and 4), show how the investment channel shapes impact fiscal multipliers.
5McCallum’s full depreciation approach is applicable when government expenditures are perfect substitutes to pri-
vate consumption. In that case, shocks to government spending are perfectly offset and the time profile of government
spending does not matter.
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2.1 Impact Government Spending Multipliers
The impact response of investment to a government spending shock has an ambiguous sign. Most of
the existing literature on fiscal multiplier (including Hall (2009), Christiano et al. (2011) or Woodford
(2011)) mentions crowding-out type effects on investment, in which the rise in real interest rate
consecutive to an increase in government spending reduces investment. Implicitly, this effect describes
the response of savings (represented in blue in Figure 1), i.e. movements along the capital demand
schedule.
Figure 1: The ambiguous response of capital to a government spending shock
next period
capital input
real interest rate
next period
K ′d
K ′s
next period
capital input
real interest rate
next period
K ′d
K ′s
But policies which stimulate employment also raise the marginal product of capital, and therefore
shift the demand for capital services (in red), making the shift in equilibrium capital ambiguous. The
capital demand effect is not specific to our setup (see Aiyagari et al. (1992) and Baxter and King
(1993)). It is present as soon as factors are substitutable and employment increases.
The position of the capital demand schedule (displayed in red in Figure 1) depends on expectations
of future employment. Hence, the persistence of government spending shock determines how much
capital demand shifts up, hence the net effect on investment. On Figure 1, shifts in the demand
and supply for capital services perfectly offset. Next proposition characterizes the persistence of
governement spending for which this result holds.
Proposition 3 In the economy with capital accumulation described in section 1.1, the impact re-
sponse of investment to an increase in government spending, ∆x0
∆g0
, can have both signs. It is de-
termined by a cutoff rule on the persistence of government spending: there exists a threshold value
0 < ρ? < 1 of the persistence of government spending such that
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– when ρ = ρ?, investment does not react to a change in government spending;
– the impact investment multiplier ∆x0
∆g0
is strictly positive for any ρ > ρ?;
– the impact investment multiplier ∆x0
∆g0
is strictly negative for any ρ < ρ?.
Proof: Short–run investment multipliers write ∆xh
∆g0
= sx
sg
∂x̂t+h
∂εt
for h = 0, 1, 2, . . .. The impact in-
vestment multiplier is obtained using the stochastic process described in the previous proposition:
∆x0
∆g0
= ρ−θ1
βθ
−ρ . Since 0 < β < 1 and 0 < θ < 1, this multiplier is an increasing convex function of ρ
and has the sign of its numerator, ρ− θ. Hence, ρ? = θ. 
The increase in government spending, which acts as a drain on resources, has two opposite effects
on investment. On the one hand, households want to smooth their consumption and eat part of
the existing capital (a crowding-out like effect). On the other hand, it stimulates employment and
the marginal productivity of capital, increasing the demand for capital services. What matters for
capital accumulation and investment is in fact the expectations of next period labor input. The more
persistent the shock, the larger is that expectation. Capital accumulation is therefore desirable when
government spending and employment are highly persistent, while households facing very temporary
fiscal shocks exhibit negative savings. When the persistence parameter of government spending is
equal to the threshold, ρ = θ, the crowding-out and crowding-in effects exactly cancel out. In that
case, capital accumulation will never be affected and fiscal multiplier are identical to those of the
constant–capital economy, as reported in Proposition 1.
Note that the size of the shock does matter for the response of next period labor input and current
investment, but not for the value of multipliers which are scaled objects.
The impact investment multiplier ∆x0
∆g0
= ρ−θ1
βθ
−ρ is not only an increasing function of the persistence
parameter of government spending, ρ, but also a convex one (see the blue line in Figure 2 for
an illustration). Highly persistent government spending processes stimulate investment as well as
employment, and that magnification becomes larger and larger as the persistence of government
spending increases.
As in Proposition 3, a cutoff rule will remain valid in all the extensions we consider later. While
in other versions of the model, the threshold value will be a possibly complicated function of the
underlying parameters, it is particularly simple in this economy with complete depreciation and
linear disutility of labor: the cutoff value ρ? is equal to θ, the capital share. For a given value of the
persistence parameter ρ, the impact investment multiplier is a decreasing function of the elasticity
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Figure 2: Investment multiplier and government spending persistence
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Note: The parameters chosen for this illustration are β = .99, θ = .4 and g¯
y¯
= .2.
of next period output with respect to today’s investment, θ. This means that, when returns to
capital are low, agents need to invest a lot today to relax future resource constraints. We can also
perform comparative statics with respect to the discount factor β, and see that the impact investment
multiplier increases when agents value the future more, strengthening the discounted utility benefits
of current investment.
The next proposition will show why the response of investment is crucial to understand fiscal
multipliers.
Proposition 4 The impact government spending multiplier on output in the economy with capital
accumulation ∆y0
∆g0
combines the static output multiplier in the economy ∆y
∆g
∣∣∣
k¯
and the impact invest-
ment multiplier ∆x0
∆g0
:
∆y0
∆g0
=
∆y
∆g
∣∣∣∣
k¯
×
(
1 +
∆x0
∆g0
)
.
The same decomposition holds for the impact consumption multiplier
∆c0
∆g0
=
∆c
∆g
∣∣∣∣
k¯
×
(
1 +
∆x0
∆g0
)
.
as well as the impact employment multiplier
∆n0
∆g0
=
∆n
∆g
∣∣∣∣
k¯
×
(
1 +
∆x0
∆g0
)
.
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Proof: From Proposition 2 and appendix B, the impact output multiplier, ∆y0
∆g0
= 1
sg
∂ŷt
∂εt
, equals ∆y0
∆g0
=
1
1+ θ
1−θ (1−βθ−g¯/y¯)
(
1−βθ2
1−βθρ
)
= ∆y
∆g
∣∣∣
k¯
×
(
1
βθ
−θ
1
βθ
−ρ
)
= ∆y
∆g
∣∣∣
k¯
×
(
1 + ρ−θ1
βθ
−ρ
)
. The impact consumption multiplier,
∆c0
∆g0
= sc
sg
∂ĉt
∂εt
equals ∆c0
∆g0
= −
θ
1−θ (1−βθ−g¯/y¯)
1+ θ
1−θ (1−βθ−g¯/y¯)
(
1−βθ2
1−βθρ
)
= ∆c
∆g
∣∣∣
k¯
×
(
1
βθ
−θ
1
βθ
−ρ
)
. Finally, employment is
proportional to the consumption-output ratio due to Hansen-Rogerson preferences.
According to that decomposition, the response of investment may amplify or dampen the mul-
tiplier on employment, output and consumption, with respect to the constant capital case. Such
a decomposition is already present in Aiyagari et al. (1992), and holds as long as investment and
government spending are composed of the same good.
While Proposition 4 characterizes the relative values of impact multipliers with and without
capital, it does have an implication for the absolute value of the output multiplier in the general
model. Remember that the constant-capital output multiplier is smaller than one. Therefore, a
positive impact investment multiplier is a necessary condition for the impact output multiplier to
exceed one. A large part of the literature on fiscal multipliers focuses on constant-capital effects.
Taking into account the investment channel offers an alternative potential amplification mechanism.
2.2 Long-run Government Spending Multipliers
We turn to the long-run response of the economy. For that reason, we consider permanent shocks to
government spending, i.e. when ρ→ 1. The long-run response of real quantities strikingly exemplifies
how investment shapes fiscal multiplier, any adjustment in physical capital being completed in the
long-run. The asymptotic results which follow are robust to any form of rigidity that would disappear
in steady state, including nominal contracts, habit persistence, adjustment costs, and so on.
Consumption dynamics is the easiest to study. Proposition 2 has established that consumption
follow a first-order autoregressive progress, with an autoregressive coefficient θ < 1. Consumption
therefore converges back towards its initial steady–state value. The invariance of steady-state con-
sumption is a direct consequence of the infinite elasticity of labor supply assumed so far. While a
permanent increase in government spending stimulates labor supply and equilibrium employment,
it does not affect the steady-state real rate interest rate which is pinned down by the psychological
discount factor β, nor the steady-state real wage rate (which in turns depends on the capital share θ).
With Hansen-Rogerson preferences, consumption is therefore not affected and the steady-state out-
put multiplier increases with β and θ, which jointly determine the steady-state capitalistic intensity
k¯
y¯
.
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When ρ→ 1, Proposition 2 implies that the growth rate of investment follows an autoregressive
process of order one: (1 − θL)(1 − L)x̂t = sg
(
1−θ
1−βθ
)
εt. After a permanent government spending
shock, investment raises gradually and eventually converges to its new steady–state value.
Finally, the response of output combines the jump in government spending and the monotonic
increases in consumption and investment. Proposition 5 establishes the asymptotic responses of
output, consumption and investment.
Proposition 5 In the economy with capital accumulation described in section 1.1, the asymptotic
multipliers associated to permanent changes in government spending are given by
∆c∞
∆g∞
= 0
∆x∞
∆g∞
=
βθ
1− βθ > 0
∆y∞
∆g∞
=
1
1− βθ > 1
The asymptotic, constant-capital and impact multipliers on output, ∆y∞
∆g∞ ,
∆y
∆g
∣∣∣
k¯
and ∆y0
∆g0
, rank as
follows:
∆y∞
∆g∞
> lim
ρ→1
∆y0
∆g0
>
∆y
∆g
∣∣∣∣
k¯
.
The asymptotic, constant-capital and impact multipliers on investment, ∆x∞
∆g∞ ,
∆x
∆g
∣∣∣
k¯
and ∆x0
∆g0
, rank
as follows:
∆x∞
∆g∞
> lim
ρ→1
∆x0
∆g0
>
∆x
∆g
∣∣∣∣
k¯
.
Proof: ∆x∞
∆g∞ =
sx
sg
limh→∞
∂x̂t+h
∂εt
= sx
sg
(
sg
1−βθ
)
= βθ
1−βθ , which implies
∆y∞
∆g∞ =
∆c∞
∆g∞ +
∆x∞
∆g∞ +
∆y∞
∆g∞ =
1 + ∆x∞
∆g∞ =
1
1−βθ . Regarding the ranking of output multipliers, Proposition 4 implies limρ→1
∆y0
∆g0
=
1−θ
1−θ+θsc
(
1−βθ2
1−βθ
)
while Proposition 1 computes ∆y
∆g
∣∣∣
k¯
= 1−θ
1−θ+θsc < 1. For investment multipliers,
Proposition 3 gives ∆x0
∆g0
= ρ−θ1
βθ
−ρ and
∆x
∆g
∣∣∣
k¯
is null by definition.
When shocks to government spending are permanent, the asymptotic fiscal multiplier taking into
account capital adjustments exceeds the fiscal multiplier of a similar economy where capital is held
fixed. The long-run output multiplier can in fact be very large when agents are very patient and/or
returns to capital very high. The asymptotic multiplier also exceeds the impact multiplier (see the
left panel of Figure 3 for an illustration), which is itself larger than the constant-capital multiplier
when government spending are very persistent, as implied by the cutoff rule. The impact multiplier
14
Figure 3: The dynamics of output multipliers: illustration
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Note: The parameters chosen for these illustrations are β = .99, θ = .4, g¯
y¯
= .2 and ρ = .99.
In the right panel, δ = .015.
does incorporate a response of investment, but does not account for any adjustment of the capital
stock yet.
In a sense, the constant-capital multiplier and steady-state multiplier are two polar benchmark
where either consumption or investment react to the change in government spending, but not si-
multaneously (as they do in the general case). Remark that both benchmarks can be expressed as
functions of great ratios whose counterparts are observable:
∆y
∆g
∣∣∣∣
k¯
=
1
1 + θ
1−θ c¯/y¯
=
1
1 + θ
1−θ (1− x¯/y¯ − g¯/y¯)
(14)
∆y∞
∆g∞
= =
1
1− βθ =
1
1− x¯/y¯ . (15)
2.3 Discussion
Several theoretical papers have already compared the effect of permanent and transitory government
spending shocks. Aiyagari et al. (1992) emphasize the shift in capital demand due to permanent
income mechanism when government spending follow a Markow process. They also establish the
decomposition of output effects into a constant-capital term and the response of investment, whose
sign remains undetermined. Baxter and King (1993) consider T -years increases in spending (framed
as wars) to contrast temporary and permanent (when T →∞) movements in government purchases.
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They show numerically that the output multiplier increases with the duration of spending T . They
also suggest suggest to study ends of wars, i.e. one-off reductions in government spending. Camp-
bell (1994) models government spending as a first–order autoregressive process. He emphasizes the
interaction between the labor supply elasticity and the persistence of government spending shocks
and computes numerically consumption, capital, employment and output elasticities for selected val-
ues. His numerical results only exhibit an increase in next period’s capital in response to a positive
government purchases shock when government spending is permanent. Our paper echoes the find-
ings of Aiyagari et al. (1992), Baxter and King (1993) and Campbell (1994), and provides deeper
analytical results. First, we deliver closed form solutions for the model, including the threshold value
for persistence such that investment remains constant after a government spending shock. Second,
we shed new light on different multiplier concepts. We show why constant-capital multiplier may
strongly differ from dynamic multipliers taking into account investment decisions. We also connect
long-run and dynamic multipliers. To preserve space, we do not present results with T -years gov-
ernment spending plans a` la Baxter and King (1993). But the positive effects on investment of
expected future government expenses caries over to that process: the impact investment multiplier
is an increasing function of the spending duration T and can display both signs. The cutoff rule on
T depends on the same set of parameters that the cutoff on ρ we provide. While estimates of the
first-order autoregressive coefficient of US government spending exist and are typically large (0.97
in Smets and Wouters (2007) and Leeper et al. (2010)), we do not have knowledge of an estimate of
the average duration spending.
Can we connect our results with empirical evidence on the investment response to government
spending shocks? A large VAR literature exists, whose results are unconclusive: for instance, Mount-
ford and Uhlig (2009) obtain a negative response to unanticipated government expenditure shocks
while Edelberg et al. (1999) find that nonresidential investment rises (see Ramey (2016) for a recent
survey). That literature faces the concern that government spending shocks may be partly antici-
pated and not pure surprises. If so, VAR representations would be nonfundamental. Ramey (2011b)
adresses this question with narrative techniques and finds a negative response of investment over the
1939-2008 sample. Forni and Gambetti (2011) turn to dynamic factor models and obtain a positive
investment response. Our results can help interpret the large dispersion in estimated responses. We
have shown in a simple neoclassical model that the response of investment varies with the persis-
tence of government spendings, meaning that no policy-invariant prediction can be made regarding
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investment. None of the empirical approach mentioned is equipped to control for the persistence
of the shock process, but structural DSGE models do. Recently, Leeper et al. (2011) consider a
large-scale DSGE model (a multi-sector open economy model with real and nominal frictions, non-
optimizing agents and rich monetary and fiscal policy rules) to explore which parameters matter for
the fiscal multipliers. Their quantitative analysis pinpoints the persistence of government spending
as the parameter with the highest predictive power. They also find that investment decreases unless
government spending are highly persistent. It is easy to interpret Leeper et al. (2011)’s findings
regarding the response of investment as a consequence of our cutoff rule.
Finally, we can wonder how general are the results obtained in our setup? Two steps are critical
for our analysis. First, that positive shocks to governement spending actually raise labor input.
Second, that increases in employment shift capital demand up.
In which models does the second step fail? The marginal product of capital is no longer an
increasing function of labor input when the technology is Leontieff and too much capital is available
(or, in a less interesting case, when capital and labor are perfect substitutes). This configuration
requires investment irreversibility, plus a shock large enough that desired capital exceeds current
one, despite capital depreciation. Back to the first step, the increase in employment is achieved in
our model through a standard wealth effect. Other mechanisms can stimulate employment, such as
productive government spending. Regardless of their cause, employment increases trigger the second
step of the investment channel.
3 Extensions under Incomplete Depreciation
In this section, we extend our analysis to an incomplete depreciation setup, where the capital stock
evolves according to the law of motion
kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + xt,
where 0 < δ < 1 is a constant depreciation rate.6
Using this law of motion on capital, we will also consider more general specifications of the utility
function. We will show that two results established in the previous section are left unaffected. First,
6Capital utilization decisions which affect the depreciation rate would not change our qualitative analysis. Models
with endogenous capital utilization are observationnally equivalent to models without this intensive margin, but
displaying a larger elasticity of output with respect to labor input. Therefore, capital utilization would reduce the
threshold persistence value for which investment does not react to government spending.
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short-run fiscal multipliers combine a constant-capital effect and the response of investment. Second,
the sign of the investment multiplier obeys the same cutoff rule.
From now on, we will generically denote P the vector of deep parameters (the set of which will
be environment–specific), with the exception of the persistence of government spending ρ. We will
present several extensions of our basic setup in which the cutoff rule and impact output multiplier
exhibit the following generic representation:
∆x0
∆g0
=
ρ− C (P)
U (P)− ρ (16)
∆y0
∆g0
= K (P)×
[
1 +
ρ− C (P)
U (P)− ρ
]
(17)
with C (P), K (P) and U (P) three reduced–form coefficients, functions of the parameter vector P .
K (P) denotes the constant-capital output multiplier, defined as in the previous section (see Definition
1). U (P) is the unstable root of the dynamical system and is always larger than one. The third
reduced–form coefficient, C (P), which shows up as a threshold on ρ in the numerator, drives the
expected dynamics of consumption when capital is held fixed. It appears in a log-linear version of
the Euler equation embedding optimal labor choices, of the form
Etĉt+1 = C (P) ĉt −X (P) k̂t+1. (18)
As already pointed out, Hansen-Rogerson preferences imply that X (P) = 0 and the dynamics of
consumption is autonomous.
In the environment studied in the previous section, P contains the value of β, θ and g¯/y¯. The
reduced–form coefficients respectively equal
K (P) = 1
1 + θ
1−θ (1− x¯/y¯ − g¯/y¯)
, C (P) = θ < 1 and U (P) = 1
βθ
> 1.
Complete depreciation was helpful to simplify these expressions: the cutoff persistence level of gov-
ernment spending under incomplete depreciation C (P) becomes
C (P) = θ
1− β (1− θ) (1− δ) .
A large depreciation rate δ means that capital can adjust quickly. The persistence of government
spending above which capital accumulation becomes optimal is therefore lower. This is illustrated
by the left panel of Figure 3 that reports three multiplier concepts (static, long–run and dynamic)
when ρ→ 1. In this figure, ρ is larger than C (P), implying that the dynamic multiplier exceeds the
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static one for all periods. When the depreciation rate is lower (in the right panel of figure 3, we set δ
equal to 1.5% per quarter), the capital stock adjusts very slowly and so does the dynamic multiplier.
Incomplete depreciation also reinforce the convexity with respect to ρ of the investment multiplier
(see the red line in Figure 2).
In the incomplete depreciation case, the cutoff value is much larger than under complete deprecia-
tion. For the standard calibration we have used to draw our figures, C (P) = 0.96 (as compared to 0.4
when δ = 1). This value is close to, but usually lower than, available estimates of first-order autore-
gressive coefficient of actual government spending. The convexity of investment multiplier implies
that small changes in ρ trigger very large increases in multipliers in that zone of high persistence.
Throughout the section, we will emphasize whether a specific modification of the environment
affects the constant-capital multiplier K (P), the impact response of investment ∆x0
∆g0
(which can occur
through a shift in the cutoff C (P) or through a change in the denominator due to U (P)), or both.
In what follows, P also contain parameters specific to each economy studied.
3.1 Non-unit Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution in Consumption
The desire to smooth consumption through saving is one of the factors which shape investment in our
economy. To investigate the role of consumption smoothing, we allow for a more general specification
of utility with respect to consumption than the log specification. The instantaneous utility rewrites
u(ct, nt) =
c1−σt
1− σ + η(1− nt) + v (gt) (19)
where σ ∈ (0, [∪]1,+∞)0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption.
This economy reduces to the benchmark studied in Sections 1 and 2 when σ = 1 and δ = 1. We
note Pσ the vector of relevant deep parameters excluding the persistence of government spending,
i.e. Pσ = {β, δ, g¯/y¯, θ, σ}.
Utility function (19) modifies two optimality conditions: the static consumption-leisure choice
(7) and the Euler equation (8). These equations rewrite
η = (1− θ) yt
nt
c−σt (20)
c−σt = βEt
[(
1− δ + θ yt+1
kt+1
)
c−σt+1
]
(21)
Next proposition shows how a non-unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution affects the fiscal
multipliers.
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Proposition 6 With the utility function (19) and incomplete depreciation,
1. The constant capital government spending multipliers on output and consumption equal 0 <
∆y
∆g
∣∣∣
k¯
= 1
1+ θ
(1−θ)σ sc
= 1
1+ θ
(1−θ)σ [1− βδθ1−β(1−δ)− g¯y¯ ]
= K (Pσ) < 1
∆c
∆g
∣∣∣
k¯
= K (Pσ)− 1 < 0
The constant capital output multiplier is positive but smaller than unity while the constant
capital consumption multiplier is negative. Both multipliers increase with the curvature of the
utility function σ (i.e. the multipliers are decreasing functions of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution).
2. The impact multipliers on investment, output and consumption are given by
∆x0
∆g0
= ρ−C(Pσ)U(Pσ)−ρ S 0
∆y0
∆g0
= K (Pσ)×
[
1 + ρ−C(Pσ)U(Pσ)−ρ
]
> 0
∆c0
∆g0
= [K (Pσ)− 1]×
[
1 + ρ−C(Pσ)U(Pσ)−ρ
]
< 0
with C (Pσ) = 11+ 1−θ
θ
[1−β(1−δ)] < 1 and U (Pσ) = 1βC(Pσ) =
1+ 1−θ
θ
[1−β(1−δ)]
β
> 1. The threshold
value of persistence C (Pσ) is invariant to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
3. The long–run government spending multipliers (following a permanent shock) equal
∆y∞
∆g∞
=
1
1− sx ,
∆c∞
∆g∞
= 0,
∆x∞
∆g∞
=
sx
1− sx
where sx =
βδθ
1−β(1−δ) is the steady–state share of investment. They are invariant to the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution. The steady-state output multiplier always exceeds the
constant-capital one.
Proof: See Appendix C.
This proposition shows that the impact output multiplier ∆y0
∆g0
is a decreasing function of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/σ. However, the output multiplier is only affected through
the constant capital multiplier K (Pσ), while the investment multiplier is invariant to the consumption
smoothing parameter σ which affects neither C (Pσ) nor U (Pσ).
The parameter σ pins down how much the raise in aggregate savings is achieved through a
decrease in consumption and how much through an increase in output (or leisure reduction). This
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breakdown is entirely static. In the constant capital economy, national savings increase through a
relatively small increase in output and a relatively large reduction and consumption for values of σ
(close to 1). This case is displayed in blue in the top panel of Figure 4. Agents with large σ want
their consumption profile to be extremely smooth and reduce their consumption less when they face
higher government spending and future taxes (in fact, ∆c0
∆g0
→ 0 when σ → +∞ as in the lower panel,
in green). They produce the required resources through a stronger increase in labor supply, which
yields larger constant-capital output multipliers.
Figure 4: National savings and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
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The results obtained with the utility specification (19) also hold in other settings with rich
intertemporal consumption decisions. For instance, the minimal consumption model
u(ct, nt) = log(ct − cm) + η(1− nt) + v (gt)
where cm ≥ 0 is a minimal level of consumption, can be interpreted as a proxy for habits in con-
sumption decision (without adding a new state variable that complicates the derivation of the policy
function). In the log-linear approximation of the model, we have σ = (1− cm/c¯), where cm/c¯ is the
steady-state share of minimal consumption. When interpreted as a proxy for habit, setting σ = 4 is
equivalent to an habit parameter equal to cm/c¯ = 0.75, a value commonly obtained when it comes
to estimated versions of medium-scaled DSGE models (see e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2007).
3.2 Finite Elasticity of Labor Supply
We have just investigated various levels of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution when utility is
linear in leisure. We now consider finite elasticities of labor supply when utility is log in consumption.7
7We can also combine non-unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption with finite elasticity of labor
supply. To simplify the exposition, we prefer to consider each mechanism in isolation. Results are available from the
authors upon request.
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The instantaneous utility rewrites
u(ct, nt) = log ct − η
1 + ϕ
n1+ϕt + v (gt) (22)
with ϕ ≥ 0 the inverse of the Frischean elasticity of labor supply and η > 0 a scale parameter.
This representation of preferences allows to investigate the role (and consequences) of labor supply
elasticities, because the parameter ϕ can take values between zero (infinite elasticity, as in section
1), and infinity (inelastic labor supply). In the latter case, the wealth effect of government spending
disappears. We denote Pϕ the vector {β, δ, g¯/y¯, ϕ}.
Additive separability between consumption and leisure implies that the Euler equation is un-
changed with respect to Section 1 after accounting for incomplete depreciation. The only optimality
condition affected is the static consumption-leisure choice (7), which rewrites
ηnϕt = (1− θ)
yt
nt
ct. (23)
Solving the model gets more complicated because the dynamics of consumption is no longer au-
tonomous (current consumption is no longer a sufficient statistic to compute the real wage and the
real interest rate). This implies that X (P) 6= 0 in equation (18). The responses of aggregate variables
to an unexpected shock on government spending, reported in Appendix D, point out the interplay of
government spending persistence and capital adjustment in short and long–run output multipliers.
Proposition 7 With a finite elasticity of labor supply as in (22) and incomplete depreciation,
1. The constant capital government spending multipliers on output and consumption equal 0 <
∆y
∆g
∣∣∣
k¯
= 1
1+ θ+ϕ
1−θ sc
= 1
1+ θ+ϕ
1−θ [1− βδθ1−β(1−δ)− g¯y¯ ]
= K (Pϕ) < 1
∆c
∆g
∣∣∣
k¯
= K (Pϕ)− 1 < 0
The constant capital output multiplier is positive but smaller than unity while the constant
capital consumption multiplier is negative. Both multipliers decrease with the labor supply
parameter ϕ (i.e. the multipliers are increasing functions of the labor supply elasticity).
2. The impact multipliers on investment, output and consumption are given by
∆x0
∆g0
= ρ−C(Pϕ)U(Pϕ)−ρ S 0
∆y0
∆g0
= K (Pϕ)×
[
1 + ρ−C(Pϕ)U(Pϕ)−ρ
]
> 0
∆c0
∆g0
= [K (Pϕ)− 1]×
[
1 + ρ−C(Pϕ)U(Pϕ)−ρ
]
< 0
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with C (Pϕ) = 1
1+βθ
(1−θ)
θ+ϕ
y¯
k¯
= 1
1+ 1−θ
θ+ϕ
[1−β(1−δ)] < 1 and U (Pϕ) > 1. The complete expression of the
unstable root of the system is given in Appendix D. Notice that the threshold value of persistence
C (Pϕ) decreases with the elasticity of labor supply 1/ϕ.
3. The long–run government spending multipliers (following permanent shocks) equal
∆y∞
∆g∞
=
1
1− sx + ϕsc ,
∆c∞
∆g∞
= − ϕsc
1− sx + ϕsc ,
∆x∞
∆g∞
=
sx
1− sx + ϕsc
where sx =
βδθ
1−β(1−δ) is the steady–state share of investment, sc is the steady–state share of
consumption sc = 1 − sx − sg and sg = g¯/y¯. The steady–state output multiplier ∆y∞∆g∞ is a
decreasing function of ϕ. The steady–state output multiplier always exceeds the constant-capital
one and is greater than one if ϕ < sx
sc
.
Proof: See Appendix D.
The elasticity of labor supply shifts the constant–capital multiplier, as did the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution, because hours worked respond less when ϕ is large (in the limit case ϕ→ +∞,
labor supply is inelastic and K (Pϕ) → 0). This labor–supply parameter also affects the threshold
persistence of government spending for which investment is not affected by the government spend-
ing shock: C (Pϕ) increases with the labor supply elasticity parameter ϕ.8 For a given persistence
of government spending, higher labor supply elasticity stimulates employment, hence the marginal
product of capital which itself boosts investment. Symmetrically, the less elastic is employment, the
more persistence it takes for investment to increase after a government spending shock as in apparent
in Figure 5. Note however that the long–run multiplier exceeds unity as long as ϕ < sx
sc
(a condition
automatically satisfied when the utility is linear in labor supply).
An extreme case in our analysis of labor supply elasticity allows to isolate crowding-out effects
on private spending. When ϕ → +∞, employment (and therefore output) remains constant after
any change in government spending. This case exemplifies crowding-out effects: capital demand
is unaffected by government spendings (meaning that the blue line in Figure 1 no longer shifts),
while savings drop and the real interest increases (along the red line in Figure 1). The investment
8The elasticity of labor supply also affects the unstable root of the system, U (Pϕ). The expression of the unstable
root is relatively simple in the case of linear utility in leisure, but not when the elasticity of labor supply is finite.
As previously mentioned, when utility is linear in labor, both the equilibrium wage rate and the equilibrium rate of
interest do not depend on the capital stock, making the dynamics of consumption autonomous. This technical reason
explains that the stable root of the system is in that case equal to the threshold value C (Pϕ). Since the product of
the stable and unstable root always equal 1/β in frictionless setups, the unstable root is easy to compute.
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Figure 5: Threshold persistence value and convex disutility of labor
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1
∆x0
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> 0
multiplier remains negative for all values of ρ: ∆x0
∆g0
= ρ−1U(Pϕ)ϕ→+∞−ρ ≤ 0. The persistence in government
spendings pins down how the reduction in private spending is split between consumption and saving.
The impact consumption response, ∆c0
∆g0
= −U(Pϕ)ϕ→+∞−1U(Pϕ)ϕ→+∞−ρ , is always negative and decreasing in the
persistence of public spending ρ. When shocks are quasi-permanent, consumption adjusts one for
one, leaving savings unchanged as in any permanent income setup. With pure transitory shocks, the
consumption is weakly affected and most of the adjustment concerns savings.
4 Market Imperfections
We study in this section two variants of the benchmark model which embed market imperfections. We
can extend our analysis of governement spending multipliers to non-optimal equilibrium allocations.
4.1 Endogenous External Discounting
We consider a formulation of endogenous discounting where households do not internalize the fact
that their discount factor depends on their own levels of consumption.9 We assume that the discount
factor depends on the average level of consumption per capita, c˜t, which individual households take
as given:
βt+1 = β(c˜t)βt
with β0 = 1. As usual, we assume ∂β(c˜t)/∂c˜t < 0, i.e. agents are more impatient when aggregate
consumption increases. The foundations of this specification relies both on “jealousy” or “catching
up with the Joneses” effect, as the individual household is more impatient and wants to consume
more today when the aggregate (or reference social group) does. Here we denote ω the elasticity
of the discount factor with respect to consumption. We also assume β(c¯) = β, which implies that
the long-run multiplier is not affected by this modification in discounting. This economy nests our
9See Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) for an application in a small open economy setup.
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benchmark economy when ω = 0 and we label Pω = {β, δ, g¯/y¯, ω} the relevant vector of structural
parameters. We consider again linear utility in leisure (ϕ = 0).
The only condition modified is the Euler equation on consumption
1
ct
= β(c˜t)Et
(
1− δ + θ yt+1
kt+1
)
1
ct+1
.
In equilibrium, individual and average per capita variables are identical, c˜t = ct, and this equation
rewrites
1
ct
= β(ct)Et
(
1− δ + θ yt+1
kt+1
)
1
ct+1
As before, the short–run multipliers are obtained by solving the log-linear approximations about
the non-stochastic steady state of the FOCs and equilibrium conditions. Although endogenous
discounting does not alter the multiplier with constant capital, this mechanism increases the short-
run response of the economy to a government spending shock for a given persistence level.
Proposition 8 With endogenous external discounting and incomplete depreciation,
1. The constant capital government spending multipliers on output and consumption are identical
to the benchmark model, i.e. 0 <
∆y
∆g
∣∣∣
k¯
= 1
1+ θ
(1−θ) sc
= 1
1+ θ
(1−θ) [1− βδθ1−β(1−δ)− g¯y¯ ]
= K (Pω) < 1
∆c
∆g
∣∣∣
k¯
= K (Pω)− 1 < 0
The constant capital output multiplier is positive but smaller than unity while the constant
capital consumption multiplier is negative.
2. The impact multipliers on investment, output and consumption are given by
∆x0
∆g0
= ρ−C(Pω)U(Pω)−ρ S 0
∆y0
∆g0
= K (Pω)×
[
1 + ρ−C(Pω)U(Pω)−ρ
]
> 0
∆c0
∆g0
= [K (Pω)− 1]×
[
1 + ρ−C(Pω)U(Pω)−ρ
]
< 0
The threshold value of persistence C (Pω) = 1−ω1+ 1−θ
θ
[1−β(1−δ)] < 1 is a decreasing function of ω,
the elasticity of the discount factor with respect to aggregate consumption. The unstable root
U (Pω) = 1+
1−θ
θ
[1−β(1−δ)]
β
> 1 is invariant to ω.
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3. The long–run government spending multipliers (following permanent shocks) are identical to
the benchmark model, i.e.
∆y∞
∆g∞
=
1
1− sx ,
∆c∞
∆g∞
= 0,
∆x∞
∆g∞
=
sx
1− sx
where sx =
βδθ
1−β(1−δ) is the steady–state share of investment. The steady-state output multiplier
always exceeds the constant-capital one.
Proof: See Appendix E.
The multiplier with constant capital is the same as in the benchmark model, K (P) = 1
1+ θ
(1−θ) sc
=
1
1+ θ
(1−θ) [1− βδθ1−β(1−δ)− g¯y¯ ]
, because the discount factor does not modify the intra-temporal allocation.
The impact output multiplier is affected by endogenous discounting through the second term,
the impact response of investment. Endogenous discounting modifies C (Pω), the persistence of
government spending for which investment is not affected by the government spending shock, in a
simple way: C (Pω) = (1−ω) C (P). This change in dynamics is easy to understand. After a positive
shock on public spending, individual households reduce their consumption due to the negative wealth
effect. In equilibrium, all households take the same decisions, so average per capita consumption c˜t
is reduced. This makes agents more patient since the discount factor is a decreasing function of the
aggregate consumption. Households have an additional incentive to save and are more willing to
increase their capital stock, which amplifies the investment channel.
Since C (Pω) < C (P), investment would increase for a wider range of ρ when discounting is
endogenous. The unstable root U (Pω), contrarily to the stable root, is left unchanged. Therefore,
the more elastic the discount factor to aggregate consumption, the larger is the impact response of
investment.
4.2 Hand-to-Mouth Consumers
The last environment we consider deviates from Ricardian equivalence through a fraction of hand-to-
mouth consumers. Non-savers do not have access to any store of value. They consume each period
their entire disposable income, which corresponds to the labor income net of taxation, plus some
government transfers (see Gal´ı et al. (2007)). For presentation clarity, we only consider the labor
income into their budget constraint:
cnst = wtnt
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where cnst is the real consumption of non-savers. Non-savers work the same number of hours as
savers. The real wage wt is determined by savers. Hence, the consumption of non-savers directly
derives from the budget constraint. We assume that the fraction of non-savers is given by λ ∈ (0, 1],
so aggregate consumption is defined as
ct = λc
ns
t + (1− λ)cst
where cst denotes the savers’ consumption. This economy boils down to the benchmark we have
studied in Section 2 when the fraction of hand-to-mouth consumers is zero, i.e. λ = 0. As usual, the
relevant parameter vector is noted Pλ and contains β, δ, θ, g¯/y¯ and λ. Again, we assume a linear
utility in leisure for the savers.
The first order and equilibrium conditions of this economy are given by:
1
cst
= βEt
[(
1− δ + θ yt+1
kt+1
)
1
cst+1
]
cnst = (1− θ)yt
η = (1− θ) yt
nt
1
cst
kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + xt
yt = Ak
θ
tn
1−θ
t
yt = ct + xt + gt
ct = λc
ns
t + (1− λ)cst
log gt = ρ log gt−1 + (1− ρ) log g¯ + εt
Next proposition characterizes multipliers when a fraction of agents is constrained to consume
their current labor income.
Proposition 9 With a fraction λ of hand-to-mouth consumers and incomplete depreciation,
1. The constant capital government spending multipliers on output and consumption equal 0 <
∆y
∆g
∣∣∣
k¯
= 1−θ
(1−λ)θsc+(1−θ)(1−scλ) = K (Pλ) S 1
∆c
∆g
∣∣∣
k¯
= K (Pλ)− 1 = λ−θ(1−λ)θsc+(1−θ)(1−scλ)sc S 0
where sc =
c¯
y¯
= 1− βδθ
1−β(1−δ) − g¯y¯ is the steady–state share of consumption. The constant-capital
consumption and output multipliers are increasing functions of the share λ of hand-to-mouth
consumers.
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2. The impact multipliers on investment, output and consumption are given by
∆x0
∆g0
= ρ−C(Pλ)U(Pλ)−ρ S 0
∆y0
∆g0
= K (Pλ)×
[
1 + ρ−C(Pλ)U(Pλ)−ρ
]
S 1
∆c0
∆g0
= [K (Pλ)− 1]×
[
1 + ρ−C(Pλ)U(Pλ)−ρ
]
S 0
The threshold value of persistence C (Pλ) = 11+ 1−θ
θ
[1−β(1−δ)] < 1 is invariant to the share λ of
non-savers in the population. The unstable root U (Pλ) = 1 − δ + [1− scλ] y¯/k¯ = 1 − δ +
[1− scλ] 1/β−1+δθ > 1 decreases with the share of hand-to-mouth consumers.
3. The long–run government spending multipliers (following permanent shocks) equal
∆y∞
∆g∞
=
1
1− sx − λsc ,
∆c∞
∆g∞
=
λsc
1− sx − λsc ,
∆x∞
∆g∞
=
sx
1− sx − λsc
where sx =
βδθ
1−β(1−δ) is the steady–state share of investment. The steady-state output multiplier
always exceeds the constant-capital one.
Proof: See Appendix F.
The share of non-savers λ does not modify the threshold persistence level C (Pλ), but nevertheless
affects the impact response of investment. The proportion of savers shows up in the denominator
U (Pλ) − ρ, which decreases with λ. At the limit, the unstable root is close to (but above) unity
when λ→ 1.
When the persistence of government spending precisely equals the threshold C (Pλ), the impact
investment multiplier is zero regardless of the proportions of savers and non-savers. Remember that
this threshold is determined by the adjustment speed of savings, which is not affected by hand-to-
mouth agents. For other persistence levels, on the contrary, the share of hand-to-mouth consumers
will magnify the response of savings to the government spending shock. The presence of agents who
do not save adds inertia to the dynamics of aggregate consumption, making savers invest relatively
more in the face of highly persistent government spending when the fraction of hand-to-mouth agents
is larger.
The effect of hand-to-mouth consumers on impact output multiplier combines as usual the
constant–capital effect and the impact response of investment. The model can yield very large
output multiplier when the fraction of savers is arbitrary small.
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The case of consumption multiplier is of particular interest. After a positive shock to government
spending shock, rule-of-thumb consumers always consume more, contrarily to what savers do – and
in fact, precisely because savers supply more labor which raises aggregate output. In the constant-
capital case, the response of aggregate consumption is positive as soon as λ exceeds the capital
share θ. The model can produce long–run increase in total consumption even if the share λ of
hand-to-mouth consumers is rather small.
This environment is helpful to disentangle the role of consumption and investment in the output
multiplier. Our analysis has shown that the sign of the investment response is pinned down by the
persistence parameter ρ. The sign of the aggregate consumption response depends on the share of
hand-to-mouth consumers λ, whose consumption increase after an increase in government spending
as opposed to savers who reduce their consumption plans. To isolate the relative contributions of
consumption and investment, we consider three iso–multipliers. These iso–multipliers are the loci
of (λ, ρ) for which the dynamic multipliers (on impact) for output, consumption and investment
respectively satisfy
∆y0
∆g0
= 1 ,
∆c0
∆g0
= 0 ,
∆x0
∆g0
= 0
The consumption and investment loci are easy to determine given Proposition 9. C (Pλ), and therefore
the sign of the investment multiplier, is independent from λ. The ∆x0
∆g0
= 0 locus is (C (Pλ) , λ). On
the contrary, the consumption multiplier is null iff K (Pλ) = 1. That condition holds for a unique
value of λ, irrespective of the persistence of governement spending ρ. The ∆c0
∆g0
= 0 locus is (ρ, θ).
In Figure 6, these two loci respectively show up as a vertical (blue) line and an horizontal (red)
line. The black line displays all (λ, ρ) pairs such that the impact output multiplier equals unity.
The impact multiplier depends on both parameters, because the share of non-savers λ affects the
constant-capital multiplier and the persistence of government spending ρ shapes the impact response
of investment. On the North-East of this locus, the short-run output multiplier exceeds unity.
Two areas are interesting. On the lower right part of this Figure (in green), larger than unity
output multipliers are obtained through increases in investment despite negative consumption mul-
tipliers. On the contrary, the purple zone on the upper left part features an increase in consumption.
Yet, the output multiplier is below unity due to the negative response of investment triggered by a
low persistence of government spending. Our analysis shows that a positive consumption multiplier
is neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve an output multiplier above unity.
29
Figure 6: A partition of multipliers
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide new analytics of government spending multipliers. We notably show that
the investment channel matters a lot for the effectiveness of the output multiplier. Depending on the
persistence of government spending, this channel dampens or amplifies the output multiplier obtained
in a static setup. We also examine these multipliers in various dimensions: intertemporal elasticity
of consumption, Frisch elasticity of labor supply, external endogenous discounting and imperfect
financial markets under the form of hand-to-mouth consumers. In all these environments, we inspect
the mechanisms at work and show how they can modify the multipliers.
In our framework, we deliberately abstracted from other relevant features in order to highlight, as
transparently as possible, the main mechanisms at work. The existing literature insists on other mod-
eling issues that might potentially enrich our results. We mention three of them. First, we assumed
away any description of distortionary taxes. Leeper et al. (2010) considers capital and labor income
taxes. Our sole emphasis is on the profile of government spending. Second, we consider that govern-
ment spending enters the utility function in an additive way. The literature has already proposed
models wherein government spending affects the marginal utility of consumption (see e.g. Aschauer
(1985), Bailey (1971), Barro (1981), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)). With this specification,
both intra-temporal and inter-temporal allocations are modified and thus the resulting multipliers.
Third, we assume for simplicity an autoregressive process of order one for government spending.
More realistic processes, say an order two process as in Uhlig (2010), may first better approximate
the time profile of recent recovery plans (in US and Euro Area) and offer new perspectives for the
analysis of multipliers.
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Appendix
A Static economy: Proof of Proposition 1
The equilibrium of this economy is summarized by the following static equations, where we omit the
time index for simplification
y = c+ x¯+ g (A.1)
y = Ak¯θn1−θ (A.2)
η =
1
c
(1− θ)y
n
(A.3)
Equation (A.1) defines the resource constraint on the good market with constant investment. Equa-
tions (A.2) and (A.3) are the production function and the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure at equilibrium. The Euler equation is excluded in that restricted setup,
because agents do not have access to a store of value. We could include state contingent claims
without modifying the results. Differentiating equation (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) with respect to g
yields
dy
dg
=
dc
dg
+ 1 (A.4)
dy
dg
= (1− θ)y
n
dn
dg
(A.5)
dc
dg
=
c
y
dy
dg
− c
n
dn
dg
(A.6)
Plugging equation (A.5) into (A.6), one deduces
dc
dg
= − θ
1− θ
c
y
dy
dg
Using the above equation and (A.4), we get
dy
dg
=
1
1 + θ
1−θsc
and
dc
dg
= −
θ
1−θsc
1 + θ
1−θsc
where sc = c¯/y¯ ≡ 1− βθ − g¯/y¯. This completes the proof.
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B Stochastic processes of endogenous variables in the dy-
namic economy: Proof of Proposition 2
The log–linearization about the non-stochastic steady state yields
k̂t+1 =
1
βθ
ŷt − sc
βθ
ĉt − sg
βθ
ĝt (B.1)
ŷt = θk̂t + (1− θ)n̂t (B.2)
n̂t = ŷt − ĉt (B.3)
Etĉt+1 = ĉt + Et(ŷt+1 − k̂t+1) (B.4)
ĝt = ρĝt−1 + εt (B.5)
where sc and sg are defined as in appendix A. After substitution of (B.3) into (B.2), one gets
ŷt − k̂t = −1− θ
θ
ĉt (B.6)
Using (B.6), (B.4) becomes
Etĉt+1 = θĉt , (B.7)
and (B.1) rewrites
k̂t+1 = ν1k̂t − ν2ĉt − ν3ĝt , (B.8)
with ν1 = (βθ)
−1, ν2 =
1−θ
θ
+sc
βθ
> 0 and ν3 =
sg
βθ
> 0. Because 0 < β < 1 and0 < θ < 1, ν1 > 1 and
equation (B.8) must be solved forward
k̂t =
(
ν2
ν1
)
lim
T→∞
Et
T∑
i=0
(
1
ν1
)i
ĉt+i +
(
ν3
ν1
)
lim
T→∞
Et
T∑
i=0
(
1
ν1
)i
ĝt+i + lim
T→∞
Et
(
1
ν1
)T
k̂t+T .
Excluding explosive pathes, i.e. limT→∞ Et (1/ν1)
T k̂t+T = 0 and taking the limit, we obtain
k̂t =
(
ν2
ν1
) ∞∑
i=0
(
1
ν1
)i
Etĉt+i +
(
ν3
ν1
) ∞∑
i=0
(
1
ν1
)i
Etĝt+i. (B.9)
Future expected values of consumption and government spending are computed according to (B.5)
and (B.7), yielding
k̂t =
ν2
ν1 − θ ĉt +
ν3
ν1 − ρĝt,
from which we deduce the decision rule on consumption:
ĉt =
ν1 − θ
ν2
k̂t − ν3
ν2
· ν1 − θ
ν1 − ρĝt. (B.10)
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After substituting (B.10) into (B.8), the dynamics of capital is given by:
k̂t+1 = θk̂t + ν3
(
ρ− θ
ν1 − ρ
)
ĝt = θk̂t + sg
(
ρ− θ
1− βθρ
)
ĝt (B.11)
given the values ν1 and ν3. Using k̂t+1 = x̂t and (B.5), (B.11) displays a second-order autoregressive
process for investment:
x̂t = (θ + ρ)x̂t−1 − θρx̂t−2 + sg
(
ρ− θ
1− βθρ
)
εt. (B.12)
Combining (B.10) and (B.11), we obtain a first-order autoregressive process for consumption:
ĉt = θĉt−1 − θsg
1− θ + θsc
(
1− βθ2
1− βθρ
)
εt (B.13)
Finally, the stochastic process of output is a linear combination of the processes respectively defined
in equations (B.5), (B.13) and (B.12), according to
ŷt = scĉt + sxx̂t + sgĝt.
Short–run multipliers are obtained using the expressions
∆yh
∆g0
=
1
sg
∂ŷt+h
∂εt
,
∆ch
∆g0
=
sc
sg
∂ĉt+h
∂εt
,
∆xh
∆g0
=
sx
sg
∂x̂t+h
∂εt
for h = 0, 1, 2, . . .
In particular, we determine impact multipliers for h = 0
∆y0
∆g0
=
1
1 + θ
1−θsc
(
1− βθ2
1− βθρ
)
(B.14)
∆c0
∆g0
= −
θ
1−θsc
1 + θ
1−θsc
(
1− βθ2
1− βθρ
)
(B.15)
∆x0
∆g0
= βθ
(
ρ− θ
1− βθρ
)
(B.16)
This completes the proof.
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C Non-unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution in con-
sumption: Proof of Proposition 6
In the case of the utility function (19), the log-linear approximations of first–order and equilibrium
conditions rewrite:
k̂t+1 = (1− δ)k̂t + y¯
k¯
ŷt − sc y¯
k¯
ĉt − sg y¯
k¯
ĝt (C.1)
ŷt = θk̂t + (1− θ)n̂t (C.2)
n̂t = ŷt − σĉt (C.3)
Etĉt+1 = ĉt +
βθ
σ
y¯
k¯
Et(ŷt+1 − k̂t+1) (C.4)
ĝt = ρĝt−1 + εt (C.5)
where y¯/k¯ = (1− β(1− δ))/(βθ) is the inverse of the steady state capital-output ratio, sg = g¯/y¯ and
sc = 1− δk¯/y¯ − sg denotes the consumption to output ratio. After substitution of (C.3) into (C.2),
one gets
ŷt − k̂t = −σ1− θ
θ
ĉt. (C.6)
Using (C.6), (C.1) and (C.4) rewrite
Etĉt+1 = µ1ĉt (C.7)
k̂t+1 = ν1k̂t − ν2ĉt − ν3ĝt , (C.8)
with
µ1 =
1
1 + βθ (1−θ)
θ
y¯
k¯
∈ (0, 1)
ν1 = 1− δ + y¯
k¯
> 1
ν2 =
(
1− θ
θ + ϕ
+ scσ
)
y¯
k¯
> 0
ν3 = sg
y¯
k¯
> 0
Using the same solving procedure as before (see appendix B), we can determine the short-run mul-
tipliers. This completes the proof.
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D Finite labor supply elasticity: Proof of Proposition 7
In the case of the utility function (22), the log-linear approximations of first–order and equilibrium
conditions rewrite:
k̂t+1 = (1− δ)k̂t + y¯
k¯
ŷt − sc y¯
k¯
ĉt − sg y¯
k¯
ĝt (D.1)
ŷt = θk̂t + (1− θ)n̂t (D.2)
n̂t =
1
1 + ϕ
(ŷt − ĉt) (D.3)
Etĉt+1 = ĉt + βθ
y¯
k¯
Et(ŷt+1 − k̂t+1) (D.4)
ĝt = ρĝt−1 + εt (D.5)
where y¯/k¯ = (1− β(1− δ))/(βθ) is the inverse of the steady state capital-output ratio, sg = g¯/y¯ and
sc = 1− δk¯/y¯ − sg denotes the consumption to output ratio. After substitution of (D.3) into (D.2),
one gets
ŷt =
θ(1 + ϕ)
θ + ϕ
k̂t − 1− θ
θ + ϕ
ĉt (D.6)
or equivalently
ŷt − k̂t = −ϕ(1− θ)
θ + ϕ
k̂t − 1− θ
θ + ϕ
ĉt (D.7)
Using (D.7), (D.1) and (D.4) rewrite
Etĉt+1 = µ1ĉt − µ2k̂t+1 (D.8)
k̂t+1 = ν1k̂t − ν2ĉt − ν3ĝt , (D.9)
with
µ1 =
1
1 + βθ (1−θ)
θ+ϕ
y¯
k¯
∈ (0, 1)
µ2 =
βθϕ 1−θ
θ+ϕ
y¯
k¯
1 + βθ 1−θ
θ+ϕ
y¯
k¯
≥ 0
ν1 = 1− δ + θ1 + ϕ
θ + ϕ
y¯
k¯
> 1
ν2 =
(
1− θ
θ + ϕ
+ sc
)
y¯
k¯
> 0
ν3 = sg
y¯
k¯
> 0
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Compared to the two previous cases, the dynamics of consumption is no longer autonomous when
µ2 > 0 in (D.8). We use here the method of undetermined coefficients (see Campbell (1994) for a
similar approach). We guess and verify the two following linear equations for the (logs of) capital
and private consumption
k̂t+1 = ηkkk̂t + ηkgĝt (D.10)
ĉt = ηckk̂t + ηcgĝt (D.11)
where the unknown coefficients {ηkk, ηkg, ηck, ηcg} can be identified using (D.8), (D.9) and (D.5). As
usual with this method, we use the restrictions provided by the conditions (D.8)–(D.9) and the process
of government spending (D.5) to identify the unknown policy rule parameters {ηkk, ηkg, ηck, ηcg}. After
replacement of (D.10) and (D.11) into (D.8) and (D.9) and using (D.5), it comes
(ηck + µ2) ηkk = µ1ηck (D.12)
(ηck + µ2) ηkg = (µ1 − ρ) ηcg (D.13)
ηkk = ν1 − ν2ηck (D.14)
ηkg = −ν2ηcg − ν3 (D.15)
From these four equations (D.12)–(D.15), we can now identify the four unknown parameters {ηkk, ηkg, ηck, ηcg}.
First, combine (D.12) and (D.14). This yields
η2kk − (µ1 + ν1 + µ2ν2) ηkk + µ1ν1 = 0
The discriminant of the characteristic polynomial is equal to (µ1 +ν1 +µ2ν2)
2−4µ1ν1 ≡ (ν1−µ1)2 +
2µ2ν2(µ1 + ν1) + µ
2
2ν
2
2 and it is positive. So, the roots are real.
Notice that when ϕ = 0, then µ2 = 0 and the stable root of the characteristic polynomial is
ηkk = µ1 < 1 (the unstable root is ν1 > and µ1ν1 = 1/β). When ϕ > 0, then µ2 > 0 and the stable
root is given by
ηkk =
µ1 + ν1 + µ2ν2 −
√
(µ1ν1 + µ2ν2)2 − 4µ1ν1
2
∈ (0, 1)
and the unstable root is given by 1/(βηkk).
From (D.14), we get
ηck =
ν1 − ηkk
ν2
> 0
because ν1 > 1, ηkk < 1 and ν2 > 0. From (D.13), (D.15) and the previous expression, we deduce
ηcg = −ν3
ν2
(
ν1 − ηkk + µ2ν2
µ1 + ν1 + µ2ν2 − ηkk − ρ
)
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From the stable root ηkk of the characteristic polynomial we deduce
ν1 + µ1 + ν2µ2 − ηkk − ρ = µ1 + ν1 + µ2ν2 +
√
(µ1ν1 + µ2ν2)2 − 4µ1ν1
2
− ρ
=
1
βηkk
− ρ
The coefficient ηcg simply rewrites
ηcg = −ν3
ν2
(
ν1 − ηkk + µ2ν2
1
βηkk
− ρ
)
Since {ν1, 1/(βηkk)} > 1, {µ2, ν2} > 0 and ρ ∈ [0, 1], it follows that ηcg is negative, so the private
consumption decreases after a rise in government spending. Finally, we can derive ηkg from ηcg and
(D.15):
ηkg = −ν2
[
−ν3
ν2
(
ν1 − ηkk + µ2ν2
1
βηkk
− ρ
)]
− ν3
= ν3
(
ν1 − ηkk + µ2ν2
1
βηkk
− ρ − 1
)
= ν3
(
ν1 − ηkk + µ2ν2
1
βηkk
− ρ − 1
)
= ν3
(
ν1 − ηkk + µ2ν2 − 1βηkk + ρ
1
βηkk
− ρ
)
Since µ1 = −(ν1 − ηkk + µ2ν2 − (βηkk)−1), it comes:
ηkg = ν3
(
ρ− µ1
1
βηkk
− ρ
)
So, the sign of ηkg is of the sign of ρ−µ1. In fact, µ1 appears a particular value for ρ such that ηkg = 0.
Notice that when ϕ = 0, the expression of ηkg simplifies a lot since µ2 = 0 and ν1 = 1/(βηkk):
ηkg|ϕ=0 = ν3
(
ρ− µ1
ν1 − ρ
)
From the above identifications, we now turn to the characterization of the multiplier (output, con-
sumption and investment). Let us first consider, the output multiplier. From the impact response of
consumption, given by ηcg, we can obtain the impact response of output after replacement into the
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production function (i.e. −(1− θ)(1 + ϕ)ηcg/(θ + ϕ)). The impact output multiplier is given by
∆y0
∆g0
= −ηcg 1− θ
θ + ϕ
y¯
g¯
=
(1− θ)
θ + ϕ
y¯
g¯
ν3
ν2
(
ν1 − ηkk + µ2ν2
1
βηkk
− ρ
)
=
1
1 + θ+ϕ
(1−θ)
c¯
y¯
(
ν1 − ηkk + µ2ν2
1
βηkk
− ρ
)
So the multiplier is positive and it is an increasing function of ρ. The impact multiplier on consump-
tion is directly deduced from ηcg:
∆c0
∆g0
= ηcg
c¯
g¯
= −ν3
ν2
(
ν1 − ηkk + µ2ν2
1
βηkk
− ρ
)
= − 1
1 + (1−θ)
θ+ϕ
y¯
c¯
(
ν1 − ηkk + µ2ν2
1
βηkk
− ρ
)
The multiplier on consumption is negative and takes larger negative values when the government
spending shock is more persistent. The multiplier on investment is deduced from ηkg
∆x0
∆g0
=
ηkg
δ
x¯
g¯
=
ν3
δ
x¯
g¯
(
ρ− µ1
1
βηkk
− ρ
)
=
ρ− µ1
1
βηkk
− ρ
This completes the proof.
E Endogenous external discounting: Proof of Proposition 8
The log–linearization about the non-stochastic steady state
k̂t+1 = ν1k̂t − ν2ĉt − ν3ĝt (E.1)
ŷt = θk̂t + (1− θ)n̂t (E.2)
n̂t = ŷt − ĉt (E.3)
Etĉt+1 = (1− ω)ĉt + βθy
k
Et(ŷt+1 − k̂t+1) (E.4)
ĝt = ρĝt−1 + εt (E.5)
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where, as before, ν1 = 1− δ+ y/k > 1, ν2 = y¯k¯ (sc + (1− θ)/θ), ν3 = y¯k¯sg and y¯k¯ = (1− β(1− δ))/(βθ)
is the steady output to capital ratio. Substituting (E.3) into (E.2), we obtain
ŷt = k̂t − 1− θ
θ
ĉt (E.6)
and substituting (E.6) into (E.4), one gets
Etĉt+1 = (1− ω)µĉt (E.7)
where µ < 1 is defined as previously,
µ =
1
1 + βθ y¯
k¯
1−θ
θ
The reader can check that (1 − ω)µν1 6= 1/β unless ω = 0 (no externality in discounting). Using
the same solving procedure as before (see appendix B), we can determine the short-run multipliers.
This completes the proof.
F Hand-to-mouth consumers: Proof of Proposition 9
The log–linearization of the non-savers consumption about the non-stochastic steady state implies
that their consumptions is proportional to aggregate output
ĉnst = ŷt
and thus the aggregate consumption is given by
ĉt = λĉ
ns
t + (1− λ)ĉst ≡ λŷt + (1− λ)ĉst
This yields the following equations
k̂t+1 = ν˜1k̂t − ν˜2ĉst − ν3ĝt (F.1)
ŷt = θk̂t + (1− θ)n̂t (F.2)
n̂t = ŷt − ĉst (F.3)
Etĉ
s
t+1 = ĉ
s
t + βθ
y¯
k¯
Et(ŷt+1 − k̂t+1) (F.4)
ĝt = ρĝt−1 + εt (F.5)
where
ν˜1 = 1− δ + y¯
k¯
(1− scλ) ≡ ν1 − scλy¯
k¯
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and ν1 is defined as before
ν1 = 1− δ + y¯
k¯
> 1
It is easy to verify that ν˜1 > 1,∀λ ∈ [0, 1) and sg > 0. So the model is determinate and (F.1) can be
solved forward. The parameter ν˜2 is given by
ν˜2 = ν2 − y¯
k¯
scλ
θ
,
where ν2 =
y¯
k¯
(sc + (1− θ)/θ) is defined as before. The parameter ν3 = y¯k¯sg is the same as before and
y¯
k¯
= (1− β(1− δ))/(βθ) is the steady output to capital ratio.
Substituting (F.3) into (F.2), we obtain
ŷt = k̂t − 1− θ
θ
ĉst (F.6)
and substituting (F.6) into (F.4), one gets
Etĉ
s
t+1 = µĉ
s
t (F.7)
where µ < 1 is defined as previously,
µ =
1
1 + βθ y¯
k¯
1−θ
θ
It comes immediately that µν˜1 6= 1/β unless λ = 0 (the share of non-savers is zero). Now, using the
same solving procedure as before (see appendix B), we can determine the short-run multipliers. This
completes the proof.
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